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Catherine Herfeld: Professor List, what comes to your mind when someone refers to rational 
choice theory? What do you take rational choice theory to be? 
Christian List: When students ask me to define rational choice theory, I usually tell them that it is a 
cluster of theories, which subsumes individual decision theory, game theory, and social choice 
theory. I take rational choice theory to be not a single theory but a label for a whole field. In the 
same way, if you refer to economic theory, that is not a single theory either, but a whole discipline, 
which subsumes a number of different, specific theories. I am actually very ecumenical in my use of 
the label ‘rational choice theory’. I am also happy to say that rational choice theory in this broad 
sense subsumes various psychologically informed theories, including theories of boundedly rational 
choice. We should not define rational choice theory too narrowly, and we definitely shouldn’t tie it 
too closely to the traditional idea of homo economicus. 
Catherine Herfeld: If you take rational choice theory to be this set of approaches that are applied 
across various different disciplines from mathematics, to economics, political science, and other 
social sciences, do you nevertheless think that these different approaches have something in 
common, which makes them a rational choice theory? 
Christian List: Part of the way in which we demarcate the field may be historical. Many of the 
theories that fall under the label ‘rational choice theory’ can be traced back to certain overlapping 
origins. Game theory goes back to John von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern, John Nash, and others. 
Decision theory goes back to Frank Ramsey, Bruno de Finetti, and Leonard Savage, and to the 
history of probability theory more broadly. And social choice theory goes back to Amartya Sen, 
Kenneth Arrow, and even earlier to Nicolas de Condorcet. Most of the approaches that now fall 
under the label of ‘rational choice theory’, broadly construed, got at least some inspiration from 
these origins, though they have developed in different ways.  
Even theories of boundedly rational choice and psychologically informed theories were often 
prompted by difficulties with orthodox rational choice theory. Their starting point was often the 
perceived need to give up, modify, or amend some restrictive aspects of rational choice theory while 
preserving other aspects. Something else that many accounts of rational choice have in common is 
that they are committed to a certain kind of ‘belief–desire’ model of intentional agency. 
Catherine Herfeld: What those approaches of Kenneth Arrow, John von Neumann, and John Nash 
also seem to have in common is that they deviated conceptually from traditional choice theories in 
being grounded upon of mathematical logic. They used set theory, probability theory, and the 
axiomatic method in formulating their account of rational choice. Do you think that those tools from 
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mathematical logic is also what unifies them? 
Christian List: It is true that mathematical methods are common to all of the different approaches 
that fall under the umbrella of rational choice theory. But they are not all axiomatic. While in the 
core areas of rational choice theory axiomatic approaches are quite central, some developments in, 
for instance, theories of boundedly rational choice or psychologically informed decision theory 
have not always proceeded by focusing on axiomatization. Instead they have sometimes just 
proposed certain decision principles and suggested that those decision principles are reasonably 
accurate models of human decision making under certain conditions. Axiomatizing those decision 
principles is not always the main focus.   
Catherine Herfeld: You mentioned bounded rationality as an example of a psychologically more 
informed rational choice theory. However, one might question the degree to which those approaches 
count as a rational choice theory. Rather, some people would argue that those accounts are 
alternatives to rational choice theory in that we place much stronger constrains on rationality and 
thereby account for the cognitive and other limitations that people confront when reasoning 
rationally. Where should we start drawing a line between rational and non-rational choice theories, 
if it is not between rational and boundedly rational choice theories? 
Christian List: We should not get too worked up about drawing boundaries. At the end of the day, 
how exactly we demarcate rational choice theory is much less relevant than what we take to be 
good theories of human decision-making.  
Catherine Herfeld: Do you consider Prospect Theory to be rational choice theory? 
Christian List: Prospect Theory is an example of a psychologically informed theory of choice. It is 
a contribution to the broadly defined field I have described, though it relaxes some of the 
assumptions of orthodox rational choice theory. 
Kahnemann and Tversky, the original proponents of Prospect Theory, observed that decision makers 
often violate certain classical principles of expected utility maximization. In particular, people’s 
choices are often not invariant under redescriptions of the options. Such effects are called ‘framing 
effects’. For example, the same person may make different choices, depending on whether the 
options are described in terms of losses or in terms of gains, even when the material consequences 
are the same. A classical theory of expected utility maximization cannot accommodate such choice 
patterns. The question, then, is how we can modify the classical theory so as to account for those 
empirically observed patterns. Prospect Theory gives us a way of doing this. It introduces the idea 
that choices may depend on a reference point. This allows us to capture the fact that people have 
different attitudes to losses than to gains. 
Prospect Theory also illustrates my earlier point that axiomatization is not always the main focus. 
Prospect Theory offers certain formal decision principles which describe how agents make their 
choices. But how we axiomatize those principles is secondary. What matters is whether the 
proposed decision principles explain the empirically observed patterns of choices.   
Catherine Herfeld: However, Prospect Theory is mostly cited as a long-awaited alternative to 
rational choice theory that departs from the empirical observation that people are biased in their 
judgement and that they do not perform the behavior that expected utility theory would predict. 
Christian List: It is true that Prospect Theory is a theory of certain non-classical patterns of choice. 
If one understands rationality in a relatively narrow, classical sense, then of course Prospect Theory 
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is a theory of non-rational choice. I tend to use the label ‘rational choice theory’ more ecumenically, 
so as to include psychologically informed theories like Prospect Theory too. As I said, I am much 
less concerned with drawing boundaries than with the question of what would be a good theory of 
human decision-making. 
Catherine Herfeld: In your recent paper entitled Mentalism versus Behaviourism in Economics: A 
Philosophy-of-Science Perspective, you – together with your collaborator Franz Dietrich – argue for 
mentalism and against behaviorism in economics. You define mentalism as the view that mental 
states, such as preferences and beliefs, that are used in social scientific theories, ‘capture real 
phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science’ (Dietrich/List 2016a, 249). You define 
behaviourism, in contrast, as the view that those mental states ‘are nothing but constructs re-
describing people’s behaviour’ (ibid.). More specifically, you take the position that although 
economists are not necessarily interested in mental states per se, they have to take them on board. 
This is because, as economics is a science, economists have to take the theoretical entities they 
actually postulate in their best theories as referring to something in the world. You claim that choice 
theories in economics make specific ontological commitments and entities that they evoke when 
they use, e.g., utility functions or binary relations, do actually exist. Those theoretical concepts refer 
to something that we would take to be mental states. And you take the position that as long as we do 
not have independent reasons to doubt that our best economic theories, such as for example 
expected utility theory, are false, we should take their ontological commitments at face value. This 
is an argument for psychological realism in economics. However, it has been shown repeatedly that 
those economic theories of choice – while maybe our best theories – do not have a lot of 
explanatory and predictive power. What would be an independent reason for rejecting economic 
theories, and expected utility theory in particular, if it is not their empirical power? 
Christian List: Classical expected utility theory is of course too simplistic. One might argue that it 
has already been falsified by empirical observations of human choice behaviour. However, the more 
sophisticated and psychologically informed versions of decision theory, which might replace 
expected utility theory, still involve a commitment to mental states. Expected utility theory is just 
the simplest example of a formal theory of choice in which beliefs and desires play a certain role. 
But beliefs and desires continue to play important roles in more psychologically informed theories. 
Prospect Theory is not my own favorite theory, but it is an example of a theory that retains a role for 
preferences and beliefs, just as standard expected utility theory does, albeit in a revised form. It still 
involves a commitment to mental states.  
Let me explain the background to our argument for mentalism in more detail. First, consider the 
natural sciences. Our theories in the sciences, for instance in physics, seek to explain certain 
observable phenomena. In order to do so, they often invoke a number of unobservables. In other 
words, they systematicize the observations by postulating some features of reality that we cannot 
observe themselves or that we can observe only indirectly. On the assumption that those features 
exist, we are then able to explain the relevant observations. Examples of unobservables are certain 
physical forces and fields or the tiny elementary particles of which all matter is composed. Even 
phenomena as familiar as gravity and electromagnetism are not by themselves observable. We can 
only observe their manifestations in the behavior of certain objects under their supposed influence. 
Similarly, very small elementary particles are not directly observable. They can be observed only 
indirectly, with the help of sophisticated instruments and experimental designs. When we say that 
we have ‘observed’ these particles, this usually involves a sequence of inferences, in which we rely 
  4 
on various auxiliary hypotheses and theoretical assumptions.  
The philosophy of science is divided between two camps. On the one hand, there are the 
‘instrumentalists’, who believe that these unobservables are just instrumentally useful constructs 
that we invoke in order to make sense of our observations. On the other hand, there are the 
‘realists’, who think that the unobservables are real features of the world. Many philosophers of 
science think that realism is more compelling because the distinction between observables and 
unobservables is very difficult to draw in practice and it keeps shifting all the time as our 
instruments and experiments get more sophisticated. Microscopy now allows us to observe a lot of 
things that we couldn’t observe in the past. Moreover, if the postulated unobservables weren’t real, 
the success of science would be a bit of a miracle. Why would postulating gravity or the Higgs 
boson be explanatorily useful if these unobservables weren’t real? Wouldn’t this be very surprising? 
As Hilary Putnam once put it, realism is ‘the only philosophy that doesn’t make the success of 
science a miracle’.  
Given this, many philosophers of science advocate what they call a ‘naturalistic ontological 
attitude’. They claim that if you want to figure out which entities and properties are real features of 
the world, then you should consult our best scientific theories of the relevant domains. If you want 
to know, for instance, whether the Higgs boson exists, you should consult our best theories of 
particle physics. And if these theories say it exists, then so be it. Of course, the resulting ontological 
commitments are fallible, because we may learn that the theories are false and they may eventually 
be superseded. In that sense, our ontological commitments must remain open to revision.  
Now, let’s return to economics. Let’s set aside normative economics for the moment, and focus on 
economics as a positive science. One of the things all the different rational-choice-theoretic 
approaches have in common is that they try to explain the behavior of economic agents by 
attributing to them certain beliefs and preferences, perhaps also certain decision principles or 
reasoning processes. In short, they make ‘mental state’ attributions. These attributed mental states 
have certain behavioral manifestations. For example, a theory might attribute to a market participant 
a particular utility function – perhaps a function of profit or something more complicated – and a 
particular subjective probability function that assigns subjective probabilities to various states of the 
world. Then it might further attribute to this market participant the decision principle of expected 
utility maximization or something else. In this mode of explanation, the attributed beliefs and 
preferences, which are the agent’s mental states, play the role of unobservables. We can’t observe 
them directly; we can’t look into other people’s minds. But we still have good evidence for those 
attributions, to the extent that they explain those agents’ observable choice behavior. It may well be 
that the most parsimonious way to explain someone’s choices is to attribute to him or her a certain 
subjective probability function and a certain utility function. This attribution is warranted to the 
extent that it allows us to explain the agent’s choices. In short, we attribute mental states to an agent 
in order to explain the agent’s behavior. 
We can now ask what the status of the attributed mental states is. One possibility is that they are just 
useful theoretical constructs. This would be analogous to the instrumentalist view in science. But 
this view suffers from some well-known problems, including the constantly shifting boundary 
between what is observable and what is not, and the fact that it makes the success of science a bit of 
a miracle. Like in the natural sciences, it is plausible in economics to adopt a realist view, according 
to which we should take the commitments of our best theories at face value, provided those theories 
are sufficiently well confirmed and we are reasonably confident in them. Of course, if our theory of 
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people’s market behavior is poorly confirmed, then we should not take its commitments too 
seriously. It’s the same in the natural sciences: if we have got a non-standard theory of particle 
physics and it performs poorly at predicting and explaining the relevant observations, then we 
should not take its ontological commitments too seriously. 
Catherine Herfeld: Some people would argue that standard rational choice theories, such as 
expected utility theory and its variants, are very poorly confirmed and that this is because they refer 
to unobservables – such as utility or probability judgements – that do not exist. Especially if you 
defend realism in economics, why should we nevertheless use such theories and defend them as our 
best theories? 
Christian List: I think that some reference to mental states will be indispensable if we wish to 
explain human behavior. Even if our current best theories are too simplistic and we need to find 
better ones, I still expect that some form of mentalistic explanation will be unavoidable. Future 
theories of choice will still attribute certain mental states and processes to the agents in order to 
explain their observable behavior. 
Catherine Herfeld: Some economists and decision theories have argued that standard rational 
choice theories only make as-if statements about human behavior. Some revealed preference 
theorists would even argue that they only look at behavior and do not make any statements about 
mental states of individuals whatsoever but rather – in Paul Samuelson’s case – to get rid of 
metaphysical statements about mental states altogether and thereby defend something along the 
lines of the view that you label Behaviorism. Why could we not just go with the as-if-
interpretation? 
Christian List: It is true that the most radical revealed preference theorists don’t think that an 
agent’s choice behavior genuinely ‘reveals’ this agent’s preferences or mental states, but they rather 
take preferences as nothing but patterns of choices or choice dispositions. On that view, attributions 
of preferences are nothing but a fancy mathematical way of rewriting the informational content of 
the agent’s choice function. To say that someone prefers x to y on that view is simply to say that this 
agent is disposed to choose x over y under appropriate conditions.  
There are a number of problems with this approach. The first is that it is no longer clear how that 
theory could really offer us any explanation of anything. If preferences are just representations of 
choices, then preferences can no longer explain those choices because preferences are nothing over 
and above those choices. In a good explanation, the ‘explanans’ – the thing that does the explaining 
– should not be the same as the ‘explanandum’ – the thing that is to be explained. That principle 
seems to be violated if preferences are nothing over and above choices. 
A further problem is this. If we try to define preferences in terms of choices, we run into the well-
known difficulties that behavioral economists have identified, namely that peoples’ choices often 
violate the standard conditions for representatility in terms of a preference orderings. The weak 
axiom of revealed preference or Richter’s axiom of revelation coherence are standard conditions 
under which a choice function is representable in terms of a certain kind of preference relation. If 
people violate those conditions, then we cannot simply represent their choice functions in term of 
preference relations, at least not without significant theoretical complications. 
In sum, there are at least two difficulties with a classical revealed-preference approach. First, 
representations of choice behavior in terms of preference relations do not always exist, because 
peoples’ choices often violate some of the relevant conditions. Second, even when a representation 
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of choices in terms of a preference relation exists, it is not really explanatory if we treat those 
preferences as mere representations of those choices rather than as genuine mental states.  
To give you an analogy, if a magnet attracts another object due to the relevant magnetic forces, we 
want magnetism to be the explanation for the attraction between those objects. Similarly, if two 
objects attract each other due to gravity, we want gravity to offer an explanation. We don’t want to 
say that gravity is just the fact that they attract each other. Similarly, we don’t want to say that my 
preference for apples over oranges is nothing but my tendency to choose one over the other. 
Catherine Herfeld: One of the things that revealed preference theory in its radical version might 
allow us to say is that we do not really want to offer explanations of choices in economics. Rather, 
we want to make predictions. To do that, we only need behavioral evidence to justify certain 
behavioral principles that allow us to describe how agents behave. A description of behavior is 
sufficient because what we want to predict in economics are macro-level patterns. This is what 
economists are interested in. Gathering evidence of mental states is the task of psychologists. How 
would you respond this argument? 
Christian List: To address this argument, let me draw a distinction between two different theses 
that a behaviorist might hold. The first is a thesis about the admissible evidence for economic 
theories. The second is a thesis about the ontological commitments of economic theories.  
The thesis about evidence is that the admissible evidence in economics is restricted to choice 
behavior alone. According to this thesis, when we test economic theories, we should not take into 
account any evidence about mental states, such as self-reports about mental states or evidence that 
comes from neuroscience. We should only look at choice behavior. That’s a kind of stipulative 
restriction of the evidence base in economics. The thesis about ontological commitments, by 
contrast, asserts that the ontological commitments of our economic theories should not include any 
mental states. If references to mental states feature in economic theory at all, these should be seen 
as nothing more than instrumentally useful constructs.  
It seems to me that the first of these behavioristic theses, the one about evidence, is not completely 
unreasonable. One might argue that there is a division of labor between economics and psychology, 
and that psychologists should look at different kinds of evidence than economists. Perhaps one 
might say that in economics we want to look primarily at choice-behavioral evidence. That’s not my 
own view, but it is a perfectly reasonable view, and no doubt Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer 
would hold some version of it. However, what I would argue is that even if our evidence in 
economics is restricted to choice behavior, then this does not imply that our ontological 
commitments should also be so restricted. It might be that, despite the stipulative restriction of our 
evidence to choice behavior alone, we still have good reasons to postulate certain mental states – 
genuine preferences and beliefs – if we wish to explain that evidence. That’s what Franz Dietrich 
and I argue. 
A good analogy comes from archeology. Think about what archeologists do. They investigate 
evidence from excavations. To put it bluntly, archeologists look at old pots and pans and various 
broken items that they dig out of the ground. Let us assume that the evidence base consists of 
everything they see, in particular old artifacts. But, of course, the ontological commitments of their 
theories go well beyond that evidence base. Archeologists are not just interested in describing pots 
and pans and other old items. They are interested in learning something about the cultures and 
civilizations in question. They want to know how those people in ancient societies lived, what their 
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cultures were, what their daily routines looked like, what their political organization was, what their 
religious rituals were, and so on. The archeologists’ evidence base is obviously very limited. But 
they use that evidence base to test hypotheses about those ancient societies. In the end, they come 
up with some theories that best fit the observed evidence. Those theories might commit 
archeologists to various claims about those ancient societies, claims that go well beyond the 
observable evidence itself.  
I think something similar happens in economics. We try to make sense of how agents behave in the 
marketplace and in various other settings. And it might happen that, in order to make sense of their 
observed behavior, we need to attribute certain beliefs and preferences, norms and convictions, and 
other intangible mental states to the agents. Without these mental attributions, we would not be able 
to make sense of the observed behaviour. It would then be in line with best scientific practice to 
adopt a realist view about those ontological commitments. 
Catherine Herfeld: Let’s grant the argument that, if we had a limited evidence base about people’s 
mental states in economics, then what we do with applying economic decision theories is to 
formulate hypotheses that we want to test and corroborate by using data of observed choices. 
Because those theories turn out to be more or less corroborated by our choice data, our theory 
together with the theoretical entities it postulates can be taken at face value. However, there might 
be at least two ways in which this argument fails in economics: First, our decision theories are often 
not corroborated by the choice data. Second, the explanandum in economics might just not be 
choice, which is why the relevant data that corroborate our theories is data about stable relationships 
on the macrolevel, such as for instance demand-price relationships. However, if economic theories 
are used to formulate hypotheses about group-level behavior, and are often corroborated by average 
data of demand behavior, then data about individual choice is not something we need for 
corroboration. Maybe we could even remain agnostic about what that theory ontologically might 
commit us to on the psychological level. 
Christian List: I agree that the explanandum in economics is often different from that in 
psychology. And I am certainly not suggesting that mental states are part of the explanandum in 
economics. Rather they are part of the explanans. We refer to those mental states to explain the 
observed behaviour, such as people’s consumer choices or their strategic interactions. 
Catherine Herfeld: Do you take the explanandum in economics to be individual choice? 
Christian List: One of the explananda in economics is certainly individual choice. Other 
explananda may be certain collective patterns, or aggregate variables, like inflation and 
unemployment. We want to explain market transactions, for example, both at the individual level 
and at the aggregate one. Or we want to explain why all these voters vote for Donald Trump rather 
than Hillary Clinton. Those kinds of choice behaviors are often our explanandum in economics. We 
need not primarily be interested in the relevant agents’ mental states. Nevertheless, it may turn out 
that the best explanation of those choice patterns is one that attributes certain mental states to the 
agents in question. And then I would argue that we should be realists about those mental states that 
feature in our best explanation.  
In physics, I don’t think that something like the Higgs boson, for instance, was ever meant to be the 
explanandum. It was actually postulated as a missing ingredient in the standard model of particle 
physics in order to make sense of certain things that the model was supposed to explain. It so 
happened that without the Higgs boson we wouldn’t have an equally good explanation of certain 
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physical phenomena. Our best theory therefore led us to postulate this particular particle and 
subsequently, indeed, its existence was empirically supported. 
Catherine Herfeld: Again, some economists might argue that what they want to explain in 
economics is macro-level social interaction. To do that, we could start with a description of 
behavior only, we then generalize over a large group of people and because individual deviations 
cancel each other out on average, our choice theories are a good predictor of group behavior while 
not requiring that they accurately explain individual behavior. Would you reject methodological 
behaviorism, i.e., the view that what we should represent in economic theories are not mental states 
but behavior, also in this case as a tangible approach? Or would you defend the position that we also 
have to go for mentalism in that case? 
Christian List: To address this issue, we have to distinguish between microeconomics and 
macroeconomics. There are different ways in which we might draw that line. Roughly speaking, 
microeconomics gives explanations of certain behavioral phenomena and uses tools from decision 
theory or game theory to do so. Macroeconomics looks at the relationship between certain 
macroeconomic variables. There are some economists who think that we should always provide 
microeconomic foundations for macroeconomic theories and construct individual-level models to 
underpin those macroeconomic phenomena. But there are also other macroeconomists who take a 
more holistic view and think that macroeconomic explanations can be freestanding and there is no 
need for microfoundations.  
I would say that the arguments for mentalism apply to microeconomic explanations in so far as 
those are intentional explanations and not just causal-mechanistic ones. It is crucial that the 
economic agents whose behavior we are explaining are viewed as intentional agents. We are taking 
what Daniel Dennett calls an ‘intentional stance’ towards them. By contrast, if you look at some of 
the phenomena that we study in macroeconomics – the Philips-Curve-relationship, for example – 
we are concerned with relationships between certain macro variables. Here, we might actually 
investigate those relationships as probabilistic causal relationships, where we don’t necessarily 
engage in intentional explanation.  
So, of course, if we are not engaged in intentional explanation, then the whole debate between 
mentalism and behaviorism does not even arise. The debate between mentalism and behaviorism 
really concerns the status of explanations that are of an intentional sort – that is, explanations of the 
behavior of intentional agents. 
Catherine Herfeld: What would you make of the argument that many of the individual actors that 
populate microeconomic models are in fact not human beings that have a psyche? Those actors are 
businesses, corporations, governments, and banks, etc., which do not have a psyche, also in the 
sense that they do not have a brain that is the physical instantiation of the mind. 
Christian List: One way in which we can draw the distinction between micro- and 
macroeconomics is precisely in terms of whether we are focusing on the behavior of intentional 
agents or whether we are focusing on the relationship between certain macro-variables. If we look 
at the theory of the firm, which is a core area within microeconomics, then we see that this theory 
actually models firms or corporations as intentional agents in their own right. In fact, the traditional 
theory of the firm models the firm as a utility-maximizing agent much like in expected-utility 
models of individual rational agency. In this sense, firms are sometimes modeled as rational 
individuals. In fact, such corporate actors might be even more rational in the orthodox sense than 
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human individuals. Perhaps the true homo economicus is not the human individual at all. Rather, it 
is something like a commercial corporation.  
Some people are inclined to be instrumentalists with respect to the attribution of beliefs or 
preferences to firms or group agents. They might say that for some explanatory purposes, it is useful 
to employ the tools of game theory or decision theory to make sense of how British Petroleum 
behaves. But, they claim, British Petroleum does not truly have beliefs or preferences. The 
ascription of preferences and beliefs to British Petroleum is just a metaphor or an instrumentally 
useful construct. People who hold this view would be inclined to reject mentalism when it comes to 
group agents. Yet, I want to be consistent and embrace mentalism even in the case of group agents. 
This is basically the view Philip Pettit and I have defended in our book, Group Agency (List/Pettit 
2011). We have argued that organized collectives can truly be intentional agents, with ‘minds of 
their own’, as Philip Pettit would say. If a collective entity is best explained by attributing 
intentional agency to it, then so be it. Again, the naturalistic ontological attitude would require that 
we should take the ontological commitments of our best scientific theories at face value. If our best 
social scientific theories treat certain collectives as agents, then we should accept the view that 
those collectives truly have beliefs and preferences.  
I suspect that part of the reason why some people are reluctant to attribute beliefs, preferences, and 
other mental states to group agents is that they have a very strong intuition that group agents have 
no such thing as consciousness, while individual human beings do. If consciousness, especially 
phenomenal consciousness, were the mark of preferences, beliefs, and other mental states, then it 
would indeed be hard to defend the view that group agents can have those mental states. Most of us 
think that there is no group consciousness. I have given an argument in support of this 
commonsense view in my paper, “What is it like to be a group agent?” (List 2018). But it is 
important to distinguish between a thin notion of beliefs, preferences, and other mental states in a 
functionalist sense, which we can unproblematically attribute to group agents, and phenomenal 
consciousness in a richer, non-functionalist sense, which group agents do not have. 
Catherine Herfeld: In defending mentalism, you seem to endorse the distinction between the mind 
and the brain. In defending the position that groups act intentionally and thus have preferences, 
beliefs, and other mental states, you need a concept of a group mind that has to be instantiated by 
something equivalent to the human brain. Do you also endorse the position that groups have brains 
or what does instantiate a group mind? 
Christian List: I would indeed distinguish between the mind and the brain, and I think the 
distinction is conceptually very important. It is of course true that human beings and other 
biological animals have brains. In the human case, as in the case of a chimpanzee, our cognitive 
capacities are very much tied to our brains as the underlining hardware. As a conceptual matter, 
however, the brain and the mind need to be carefully distinguished. You can think of the brain as the 
biological hardware that implements the mind, but conceptually speaking, you could imagine that a 
mind may also be implemented by a different kind of hardware. In recent years, there have been 
rapid advances in artificial intelligence and computer science. Nobody knows how long it will take 
for computer scientists to come up with genuinely intelligent autonomous systems, whose cognitive 
capacities are comparable to those of biological animals. We are nowhere near this point right now, 
but some people think that sophisticated artificially intelligent systems could be developed during 
our lifetimes. Different people give you different estimates of how long it will take. Future 
sophisticated AI systems – for example, sophisticated robots with strong cognitive capacities and a 
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rich behavioral repertoire – will obviously have a very different hardware than biological 
organisms. Nonetheless it may well turn out that the best way to make sense of such systems is to 
attribute mental states to them. In that sense, an AI system might have a mind. It has beliefs about 
its environment, it has preferences about what it wants to achieve, and it displays the kind of goal-
seeking behavior that we associate with intentional agency. But the mind of that system is 
computationally implemented in a very different hardware than a human brain. Once we recognize 
that a mind can be implemented – at least in principle – in different hardware systems, then we can 
also recognize that a group agent can in principle have a mind, which is implemented in a different 
hardware than the usual biological one. The hardware system in the case of a group agent is the 
particular organizational structure of the collective in question. It is social, rather than biological. 
Of course, at this point, the hardware system that implements the human mind, namely the human 
brain, is the most sophisticated system – at least of a certain limited size – in the known universe. 
We don’t have any other hardware system that is even remotely as sophisticated as the human brain. 
Compared to this, the hardware system of a group agent or the hardware of the kinds of robots that 
we have is very simplistic. Nonetheless, those systems can still implement rudimentary minds, 
which then give rise to certain forms of rational, goal-seeking behavior. 
Catherine Herfeld: You accept that utility and probability functions and a binary relation with a set 
of constraints (the rationality axioms) imposed on it is an idealized way to think about mental states. 
Some people would, however, argue that preferences for example do not in fact formally represent 
mental states such as desires as postulated in a folk psychological belief-desire framework and that 
therefore formal theories of rational choice in economics are not equivalent with the folk-
psychological approach to behavior in terms of beliefs and preferences. They are much thinner. 
While you think of your account as being psychologically more realistic than the traditional 
account, you draw upon similar concepts and thereby might confront the same challenge. How 
would you respond to such criticism?  
Christian List: My preferred version of decision theory is not orthodox rational choice theory. My 
preferred theory – or I should better say ‘framework’ – is the one Franz Dietrich and I are currently 
developing. We call it a theory of ‘reason-based choice’ (Dietrich/List 2016b). At this stage, it’s best 
viewed as an explanatory framework whose details still need to be developed further. The aim of 
this framework is to explain an agent’s choices not merely by attributing a simple preference 
ordering to that agent, but by attributing to the agent a richer mental construct, namely what we call 
a ‘reasons structure’. We retain the rational-choice-theoretic idea of explaining an agent’s choice 
behavior by means of a certain mental state attribution. We just provide a richer account of what the 
relevant mental states are.  
As we see it, the relevant mental states are not just preferences (and beliefs), but reasons structures. 
Classical rational choice theory can be viewed as a special case of our framework. And I think of 
this special case as an idealized case. Some features of that idealized special case must be relaxed or 
amended in order to explain choices more generally. In that sense, it is true that we give up some of 
the orthodox rationality assumptions, but we certainly do not give up the idea that there are mental 
states that explain an agent’s choices. 
Catherine Herfeld: Do you consider your reason-based rational choice theory as a step towards de-
idealizing traditional rational choice theory? 
Christian List: Yes, the aim is to arrive at a more psychologically realistic way of explaining 
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choices, while retaining as much of the elegance and parsimony of classical rational choice theory 
as possible. 
Catherine Herfeld: In your theory, you attempt to develop an account of choice that draws upon 
the work in philosophy of action. One of the theory’s virtues is that it generalizes standard rational 
choice theory and thereby shows that the standard theory is at best incomplete. What are the 
advantages of your theory over traditional classical approaches such as expected utility theory and 
what do you take the economist to get out of your theory? 
Christian List: To explain the advantages of our theory, let’s first remind ourselves of how 
traditional revealed preference theory works. For illustrative purposes, let’s set aside uncertainty or 
incomplete information, and let’s just focus on a very simple case, namely an agent’s choice 
between several options, where the agent has complete information about what those options and 
their consequences are.  
An agent’s choice behavior in this case can formally be expressed by a choice function. The choice 
function assigns to each choice context the set of those options that the agent would choose in that 
context. If the set of chosen options in a given context is singleton, then there is a unique option that 
the agent would choose in that context. If the set of chosen options is non-singleton, then the 
interpretation is that these separate options are tied for choice and maybe the agent needs to 
randomize or employ some tie-breaking criterion to pick one of those options. So, in short, a choice 
function specifies which option, or options, the agent would choose in each context. 
Now, traditional revealed preference theory seeks to explain the agent’s choice function by 
ascribing to the agent a preference ordering – or more generally a preference relation which need 
not always be a complete ordering – and then hypothesizing that the agent will choose a most 
preferred option in each context. This explanation is possible if, and only if, the agent’s choice 
function satisfies certain classical rationality conditions. We can then indeed find a preference 
ordering that will represent that choice function. But we are likely to encounter the two difficulties 
that I have already mentioned. First, there are some realistic choice functions that cannot be 
explained in terms of a preference ordering over the options, because they violate the relevant 
rationality conditions. Second, even when there is a preference ordering over the options that 
rationalizes a given choice function, this is not necessarily a genuine explanation of the agent’s 
choices.  
Let me give you an example of a choice function that cannot be naturally explained in terms of a 
preference ordering over the options. This example was given by Amartya Sen. He asked us to 
imagine a polite dinner party guest who is offered a choice among several pieces of cake. Politeness 
requires the guest not to choose the largest piece of cake, because that would be greedy. Now, in one 
situation, the guest is offered a choice between a big, a medium, and a small piece of cake and 
chooses the medium piece because it is the biggest of the three that she can politely choose. In 
another choice situation, the big piece is already gone. The only available pieces of cake are the 
medium and the small ones. Now, applying the norms of politeness again, our guest chooses the 
small piece and no longer the medium one. This pattern of choice – choosing the medium piece 
over the big and the small ones in one context and choosing the small piece over the medium one in 
another – violates some of the classical rationality conditions, in particular contraction consistency. 
The option that was chosen from the bigger menu – namely the medium piece of cake – is no longer 
chosen from the smaller menu even though that option is still available. Indeed, we cannot 
rationalize that choice function in terms of a preference ordering over pieces of cake. Of course, we 
  12 
could try to ascribe to the agent a more complicated preference ordering, perhaps a preference 
ordering over pieces-of-cake-in-a-particular-situation. But that can easily end up becoming 
tautological. We would have to re-individuate the options in a very fine-grained way, so that the 
medium piece of cake in the first situation no longer counts as the same option as the medium piece 
in the second. In the limit, options might be tied to one and only one choice context, so that the 
agent can never encounter the same option more than once. 
What Franz Dietrich and I suggest is that we should not view options as uninterpreted primitives. 
Instead, we should recognize that agents perceive the options through the lens of certain 
motivationally salient properties. An agent considers each option. The option potentially has a vast 
number of properties. Most of those properties are irrelevant for the agent, but some properties are 
motivationally salient. We suggest that when an agent makes a choice in a particular context, he or 
she looks at all the feasible options through the lens of those properties that are motivationally 
salient in that context. He or she then chooses an option which he or she thinks offers the most 
choice-worthy bundle of salient properties.  
Formally speaking, such a reason-based explanation has two components. First, we introduce what 
we call a ‘motivational salience function’, which is a function that assigns to each choice context 
the set of those properties that are motivationally salient for the agent in that context. Those are the 
properties that the agent pays attention to in that context. Second, we introduce what we call a 
‘fundamental preference relation’, which we sometimes also call a ‘weighing relation’. This is a 
binary relation over property bundles – combinations of properties. It ranks property bundles in 
terms of how choice-worthy they are for the agent. In each context, the agent now looks at the 
options through the lens of the motivationally salient properties in that context. Specifically, for 
each option, the agent considers that option’s set of motivationally salient properties in the given 
context. In effect, the agent perceives each option as the bundle of motivationally salient properties 
offered by it. Options are then ranked on the basis of how the agent’s fundamental preference 
relation ranks the relevant property bundles. The agent chooses an option whose bundle of 
motivationally salient properties is ranked most highly. 
Catherine Herfeld: How do you go about explaining human choice with your account? 
Christian List: According to the reason-based account, we explain an agent’s choice behavior, not 
by attributing to the agent simply a preference ordering over the options, but by attributing a 
‘reasons structure’, which is our term for the pair consisting of a motivational salience function and 
a fundamental preference relation (or weighing relation), as just explained. The goal is to find a 
reasons structure that entails the agent’s choice function.  
Let me give a simple example. Suppose I am a consumer and I go to the supermarket to do my 
shopping. I see all these different consumer goods there, for example, different yogurts. Each yogurt 
may have lots and lots of different properties. It might be a cherry yogurt and it has some sugar 
content, and a certain fat content, the label is blue, the brand is such and such, the price is such and 
such, the best-before date on the label is the 5th of April, and so on. You can easily see that there 
may be thousands of properties that this particular yogurt has. As a consumer, I will initially focus 
on just a few of those properties. Maybe it’s just a very small number. Maybe I am in a rush and all 
I care about is getting a cherry yogurt that is fat-free. Then ‘cherry flavored’ and ‘fat free’ are the 
only motivationally salient properties for me. Alternatively, I might be in my environmentally 
friendly mode and also care about whether the yogurt was sustainably produced, or whether it is 
free from chemical additives. This example illustrates that in different situations – that is, in 
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different choice contexts – I might focus on different properties.  
For a reasons structure to explain my choices, it would have to specify which properties I care about 
in each context, and it would have to specify how choice-worthy I find different bundles of 
properties relative to one another. If it specifies both of these things in such a way as to 
accommodate my choices in all the different contexts, then the reasons structure is choice-
behaviourally adequate. It entails, and thereby explains, the choices that I make. 
An important feature of our framework is that it captures different ways in which an agent’s choice 
behaviour can be context-dependent. Specifically, there are two dimensions of context-dependence. 
First, my motivational salience function may specify different properties as motivationally salient in 
different contexts. If I am in a rush, I may care about fewer properties than if I am in my reflective 
mode, or in my environmentally friendly mode, where these modes are triggered by different 
contexts. We call that phenomenon ‘context-variant motivation’. To explain the second dimension 
of context-dependence, note that, so far, the properties of the yogurts I have mentioned are all 
examples of what we call ‘intrinsic properties’ or ‘option properties’. If a yogurt is fat-free, for 
example, then it has that property independently of the context in which you consider it. A fat-free 
yogurt remains fat-free no matter whether you are looking at it in the supermarket, in your fridge at 
home, or in the breakfast room in the hotel. If it has that property in one context, then it has that 
property in all the other contexts too. But there can also be what we call ‘relational properties’, such 
as the property of being the cheapest yogurt. That clearly depends on the range of available yogurts. 
In one context, a particular cherry jogurt may be the cheapest, while in another it is not. Or, having 
the lowest sugar content among the available yogurts is a relational property. Another example is 
the property of being the yogurt which is placed in the middle of the shelf. All of these are 
properties that are related to the context. An option doesn’t have them by itself, but only in relation 
to the context in which it is available.  
Once we recognize that the motivationally salient properties an agent cares about may include not 
only intrinsic properties but also context-related properties, we can see that there is a second 
dimension of context-dependence, namely focusing on relational properties. We call that 
phenomenon ‘context-related motivation’.  
What I have just explained is our taxonomy of two different forms of context-dependent choice. 
One form of context-depedence is context-variance, which means that an agent cares about different 
properties in different contexts. Another form of context-dependence is context-relatedness, which 
means that the agent cares not only about intrinsic properties of the options, but also about certain 
context-related properties.   
Catherine Herfeld: How exactly is your account different from revealed preference theory? 
Christian List: First of all, classical revealed preference theory does not focus on properties or on 
reasons for choices; it just focuses on preferences over options, which are largely fixed. There are 
some exceptions, such as the characteristics-based approach of economists such as Lancaster and 
Gorman. Secondly, classical revealed preference theory does not recognize the forms of context-
dependent choice that our framework can capture. However, we can view classical revealed 
preference theory as a special case of our framework, namely the special case in which both forms 
of context-dependence are absent. The options are always viewed through the lens of the same 
properties irrespective of the context we are in. For instance, an option that is perceived as a fat-free 
cherry yogurt in one context is also perceived as a fat-free cherry yogurt in another. In classical 
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revealed preference theory, options are not perceived differently depending on the context. In this 
way, classical revealed preference theory assumes away context-variant motivation, and it also 
assumes away context-related motivation. We can therefore view it as a limiting case of our 
framework. However, our approach has the advantage of taking the context of choice into account. 
We know from the well-established work on framing effects that different contexts may make 
different properties, features, or characteristics of the options salient for decision makers. We think 
this supports the claim that, in the real world, people’s choices are often context-dependent in one of 
the ways our framework captures.  
Similarly, if we find Amartya Sen’s example of the polite dinner party guest plausible, or if we 
accept the claim that social or moral norms matter in many situations, then we have good reasons to 
think that context-related motivation and caring about relational properties are perfectly real 
phenomena. If this is so, then I would suggest that decision theory would be better off recognizing 
those phenomena.  
Catherine Herfeld: How would you go about testing your reason-based rational choice theory? 
Christian List: If we want to test a reason-based explanation of an agent’s choice behavior, one 
possibility is simply to aim at choice-behavioral adequacy. Choice-behavioural adequacy means that 
the reasons structure that we attribute to the agent implies the empirically observed choice function. 
This test is really no different than the test for any classical-rational-choice theoretic explanation. 
Choice behavior is the ultimate criterion of adequacy of a reason-based explanation in this case.  
A second possibility is to test a reason-based explanation by making predictions. Our approach not 
only allows us to ask whether a reasons structure correctly entails the agent’s observed choices up to 
now, but it also allows us to make predictions of future choices: choices that the agent would make 
in new contexts for which we do not yet have any observations. Such predictions are possible 
because reasons structures can be naturally extended from smaller domains of previously observed 
choice contexts to larger domains of additional choice contexts. We can then ask what choice 
behavior the attributed reason structure would lead us to predict when extended to some larger 
domain of contexts. That gives us a natural way of performing an enhanced choice-behavioral test 
for a reason-based explanation.  
In general, an empirical researcher using our approach would go through the following steps. First, 
observe a given agent’s choice behavior. Then, come up with a hypothesis as to what the agent’s 
reasons structure might be, and make sure that this hypothesis correctly explains the observed 
choice behavior. Next, extend this reasons structure to a larger domain of previously unobserved 
choice contexts and make predictions as to how the agent would choose in those new contexts. 
Finally, try to get some evidence through observations or experiments in order to see whether those 
predictions are correct or not.  
Note that, so far, I have only spoken about choice-behavioural tests. Psychologists might be able to 
look at evidence other than choice behavior, and use this to test certain hypotheses about people’s 
motivating reasons. To give just one example, psychologists could ask people to give verbal reports 
about their reasons. Of course, verbal reports need not always be reliable, but if we gather enough 
psychological data, then we may be able to identify some reasons structures as more 
psychologically adequate than others. In addition, there might be some psychological evidence 
about the level of cognitive complexity that we can realistically ascribe to an agent. Perhaps there is 
evidence that an agent is 
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properties. Maybe focusing on more than three or four properties at once is too hard. If so, then this 
would allow us to reject any reasons structures that deem too many properties motivationally 
salient. In this way, there could be psychological ways of testing reason-based explanations that go 
beyond choice-behavioural tests.  
Catherine Herfeld: Why is this a useful approach to rational choice?  
Christian List: Among other things, as I have already noted, it can accommodate the phenomenon 
of context-dependent choice. The properties that are motivationally salient may vary from context 
to context, which is in line with what empirical evidence from the framing literature suggests. 
Furthermore, among the motivationally salient properties, there can be relational properties. Those 
are properties which options do not have intrinsically, but only in relation to the choice context, 
such as the property of not being the largest piece of cake. What Franz and I are suggesting is that 
people who follow social norms often care about relational properties. A particular option, such as 
the medium piece of cake, may be polite in one context, but impolite in another. By recognizing that 
relational properties may be motivationally salient, we can make sense of the resulting norm-
following behaviour. Traditional rational choice theory cannot easily accommodate this. 
Catherine Herfeld: Your account seems to be empirically quite demanding. People might have 
different motivational salience functions and weighing relations. In order to explain or predict their 
choices, we would be required to have information not only about their psychological makeup but 
also about the context within which this choice is or will be taken. As such, does your account 
confront the same difficulties as traditional rational choice theory, which was challenged because it 
either lacks empirical support for the utility function or – if such support is not given – suffers from 
poor empirical power? 
Christian List: Of course, we do not – strictly speaking – know what someone’s motivational 
salience function is, just as we do not antecendely know what someone’s preferences are or what 
their beliefs are. Rather, when we try to explain an agent’s choice behavior, we make certain 
hypotheses about this agent’s mental states. In the traditional theory, we make hypotheses about 
what this agent’s beliefs or preferences are. If we are lucky and these hypotheses entail the right 
behavioral predictions, then we have some tentative support for them. Let us say we attribute to a 
firm a utility function that is strictly increasing and concave in profits. Then we look at whether this 
attribution of utilities to the firm allows us to explain its behavior in a satisfactory way. If it does, 
we have some support for this attribution. That is basically how classical rational choice theory 
works. In the reason-based framework, similarly, if we want to explain an agent’s choices, we need 
to formulate some hypotheses. We need to come up with some hypotheses about what this agent’s 
reasons structure is. Of course, we look for parsimonious hypotheses. We do not want to make 
complicated attributions. And so we must ask: what is the simplest hypothesis about the agent’s 
reasons structure that would allow us to explain and predict this agent’s choice behavior? Once we 
have identified the simplest hypothesis that does this job, then we have good reasons to accept this 
hypothesis, at least tentatively.  
Catherine Herfeld: However, it appears that your account is more demanding than the classical 
framework in the sense that you need to have to have more empirical knowledge about the specific 
context in order to come up with certain hypotheses. 
Christian List: I agree with you that if we want to analyze the role played by the context in detail, 
then we may need more information about those contexts than merely the set of feasible options in 
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each context. In that sense, reason-based explanations sometimes require a richer evidence base 
than classical rational choice theory. However, we can still use our framework without going 
beyond the evidence base of the classical theory. Take Sen’s example of the polite dinner party 
guest again. Suppose we are given only the agent’s choice function and no other empirical data. We 
know that the agent chooses the medium piece of cake from the option set ‘big, medium, and 
small’, and he or she chooses the small piece of cake from the option set ‘medium and small’. And 
perhaps we also know the agent’s choices from some other option sets. That’s the choice function, 
and – let’s suppose – we have no other empirical data. To explain the given data, the classical theory 
would then try to come up with a binary relation over the options – a preference relation – such that 
by attributing it to the agent we can rationalize the agent’s choice function. In Sen’s example, this 
would not work, unless we re-describe the options in some complicated way. If we use the reason-
based framework, by contrast, we can explain the data, namely by invoking the idea that the 
politeness property is motivationally salient for the agent and that the agent prefers the property 
combination ‘small and polite’ over the property combination ‘medium and not polite’.  
Of course, the motivational salience of the politeness property is not something we can observe 
directly. Rather, it is part of the explanans that we introduce in order to make sense of the observed 
data. That the agent cares about politeness is a hypothesis we make. But if this hypothesis gives us a 
good explanation of the observed choice behaviour, then this would at least tentatively corroborate 
the hypothesis. So, in principle, we do not need to look at richer evidence than classical rational 
choice theory does. That said, richer evidence is often helpful, because if we look at additional 
psychological evidence, we may be able to come up with better explanations. But even if you have 
only choice-behavioral evidence, you can still try to give reason-based explanations of the observed 
choices. 
Catherine Herfeld: Another objection that might be raised against your account is that it is 
tautological in the same way as classical theories can be. An infinite number of things can 
potentially be motivationally salient for an agent in a certain situation and those can also hughly 
differ across agents. However, if you do not specify empirically the motivational salience function 
for an agent – for example, that politeness is motivationally salient in the case of Sen’s polite dinner 
guest – but just postulate what is motivationally salient, it appears that the concept of motivational 
salience does not offer more substantial explanations of this choice pattern. How would you cope 
with this challenge if not by offering substantially more empirical support for your hypothesis than 
classical rational choice theorists do? 
Christian List: If you impose absolutely no restrictions on which properties you may postulate as 
potentially motivationally salient, then you can in principle ‘explain’ everything in our framework. 
That is true. But likewise, in classical rational choice theory, if you impose no restrictions on how 
you may individuate the options, the classical theory becomes tautological and you can explain 
everything. In the classical theory, if you are prepared to re-describe the options such that each 
option can occur in one and only one context – maybe you put a particular date-and-time stamp 
stamp on each option – then trivially any pattern of choices can be viewed as maximizing 
preferences over those very finely individuated options. This would make the classical theory 
tautological too.  
No theory, whether we take classical rational choice theory or our reason-based theory, can avoid 
the tautology-charge without certain auxiliary assumptions or auxiliary hypotheses. The classical 
theory becomes non-tautological only relative to certain auxiliary assumptions about what the 
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options are and how they should be described or individuated. Likewise, our theory becomes non-
tautological only if we are prepared to make certain auxiliary psychological assumptions about 
which properties may plausibly become motivationally salient and which properties may not. That 
is exactly how it is when we engage in intentional explanation. We have to rely on certain auxiliary 
hypotheses.  
When Donald Davidson discussed the methodology of intentional explanation, he famously 
proposed the principle of charity, which is a principle that is meant to guide our choice of 
psychological hypotheses in the interpretation of people’s behavior. He recognized that the 
empirical evidence about someone’s behavior often underdetermines the explanation. More than 
one explanation may be compatible with the same evidence. We need to introduce some further 
constraints in order to choose one explanation over others. Davidson’s principle of charity is an 
attempt to guide us in that choice of explanation. It tells us to go for explanations that render people 
as rational and reasonable as possible. We should accept explanations that attribute irrationality or 
unreasonableness to people only if we have exhausted all the more charitable alternatives. 
Likewise, we need to rely on certain auxiliary hypotheses and invoke certain methodological 
principles of charity in order to come up with good reason-based explanations of an agent’s choice 
behavior. 
Catherine Herfeld: The audience for your approach consists of social scientists, among others. 
Could you give an example of an economics problem that would benefit from your reason-based 
approach to rational choice? 
Christian List: The intended audience is an interdisciplinary one. This includes not only 
economists, but also philosophers, psychologists, cognitive scientists, and computer scientists 
working on AI. Our approach is applicable quite broadly. I have already given the examples of 
framing effects, on the one hand, and norm-following behaviours, on the other, where decision 
makers focus on properties that options have in relation to the choice context. The kind of context-
related choice illustrated by the example of the polite dinner-party guest is involved in many forms 
of norm compliance and ethical behaviour. Whether a particular option is norm-conforming or 
morally permissible often depends on the context in which you choose this option. Some patterns of 
behavior are acceptable in some contexts, but not acceptable in others. Insofar as social and moral 
norms play an important role in many situations, I expect our framework to be applicable quite 
broadly.  
Also, think about problems in political economy, the area of political science in which we use 
methods from microeconomics to study the behavior of politicians or voters. Having a realistic 
account of which properties of the options those agents care about and how those properties might 
depend on the context seems quite central for many applications.   
Catherine Herfeld: Some economists would argue that the classical expected utility approach, 
while being empirically inadequate at the level of individual behavior, approximates economic 
behavior reasonably well, especially on the group level. Given that it also satisfies additional 
epistemic virtues, such as consistency with other exisiting approaches in economics, simplicity, and 
predictive power, we should just keep it until we have a better alternative. In which way is your 
account a useful alternative for economics, beyond improving standard decision theory?  
Christian List: As I have argued, our approach can explain non-classical choice behaviours that are 
not adequately accommodated by classical rational choice theory. Why does this matter? The homo 
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economicus model might be a reasonably good account of the behavior of certain kinds of market 
participants, but it is extremely simplified and idealized. Maybe it captures the behavior of firms or 
commercial corporations better than it captures the behavior of individual human beings. But even 
if the homo economicus model still has a role to play in economic explanations, we must recognize 
that it is rather idealized, even from the perspective of core areas such as the theory of the firm. 
How closely firms approximate that model is – at the end of the day – an empirical question. We 
have good reasons to expect that even firms sometimes display deviations from classical rationality, 
because firms, like individuals, will be subject to informational and computational limitations and 
will occasionally also be subject to certain forms of reasoning failure. Therefore, some of the 
rationality failures that are well documented in the case of individuals can potentially occur at the 
level of firms too.  
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that even highly sophisticated market participants – such 
as financial traders – sometimes deviate from the kind of behavior that we associate with the homo 
economicus model. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the subject of behavioral 
finance, where scholars study the behavior of such market participants. Interestingly, even those 
sophisticated agents sometimes deviate from how a traditional homo economicus would behave, 
even though you would expect – based on their profession – that they are trained to act in line with 
the homo economicus model. 
So, the domain of applicability of a psychologically more realistic version of decision theory, such 
as the one that Franz and I are trying to develop, is potentially very broad. 
Catherine Herfeld: In your work, you seem to defend the position that the psychological level is 
the adequate level of of explanation in economics. Your argument against going to the neural level 
to explain behavior is that it might go too far. The explanation would be very and unnecessarily 
complex and you care about having simpler explanations. You seem to think there being a trade-off 
between the huge effort for offering a very detailed and complex explanation and the rather low 
benefit of getting the respective information. You argue that such a complex explanation offers us 
information that we do not really need in the social sciences. Do you consider neural evidence, 
which is in large parts what neuroeconomists are engaged in, to be of any use in the social sciences? 
Christian List: Neuroscience can complement economic decision theory and psychology in the 
study of human decision-making. As a complementary research program, there is absolutely nothing 
wrong with neuroeconomics. It is an interesting and potentially promising development. What I 
would object to, however, is the attempt to reduce psychological-level explanations – such as those 
in decision theory and microeconomics – to neuroscientific explanations. Similarly, I object to the 
idea that we might be able to dispense with microeconomics or decision theory altogether and turn 
microeconomics into a kind of subdiscipline of neuroscience, where instead of talking about 
preferences, beliefs, and various other intentional-level notions, we give an account of economic 
behaviour solely in terms of neurobiological processes. That, I think, is not a very promising 
approach. 
Catherine Herfeld: Could you elaborate further on your argument against reduction?  
Christian List: For different explanatory purposes, we tend to adopt different levels of description. 
There are some phenomena that are best explained at a microphysical level. If we want to 
understand the behavior of elementary particles, for instance, then clearly the microphysical level –
the one associated with particle physics – is the appropriate one. But if we look at more 
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macroscopic systems, the attempt to understand those systems at the level of the particles of which 
they are composed is not very promising. Even the attempt to reduce chemistry to physics seems 
not very fruitful. Philosophers of chemistry have made arguments to the effect that even simple 
chemical properties such as acidity are not easily type-reducible to corresponding physical 
properties. Likewise, when we move from chemistry to biology, we often need to adopt a different 
level of description than the chemical one. In biology, there is the level of the cell and its 
constituents, on the one hand, and there is the level of the organism, or the level of the ecosystem, 
on the other. In a field such as behavioral ecology, it would be very difficult to explain animal 
behavior if we tried to understand each animal as nothing but a complex chemical system consisting 
of gazillions of cells. What these considerations show is that it is quite standard in the sciences to 
move to a higher level of description for explaining many phenomena.  
For similar reasons, I would argue that even though it is important to understand the biological 
brain and how it gives rise to its remarkable cognitive capacities, the sheer complexity of the brain 
is such that by focusing on the neural level alone we would not be able to come up with 
parsimonious and illuminating explanations of human behaviour.  
Let me give you an example from the social domain. Close to my apartment in London, there is a 
bus stop and there are multiple bus lines that stop at this particular bus stop. There is the number 19 
and there is also the number 38. Aside from the difference in the number, those two buses look the 
same, and sometimes the driver of number 19 might also drive number 38, and vice versa. What’s 
more, the routes of the two buses partly overlap as well. So, initially, when you take one of the 
buses, it looks like they are on the same route. Only at some point, after several stops, the routes 
diverge: number 19 takes a different turn than number 38. How do we explain this?  
Clearly, there is a regularity here which requires an explanation. It can be observed day after day, in 
a more-or-less exceptionless manner. Bus number 19 takes one route while bus number 38 takes 
another. First of all, we must figure out that it has something to do with the relevant driver and what 
instructions he or she has received. If we were to look at the engine or the steering wheel, we would 
clearly go wrong and would not be able to pinpoint the difference between the two buses. Suppose 
we’ve figured out that the different routes have something to do with the driver. If you then do 
sophisticated brain scans of the drivers to identify how their brains differ, you would end up with an 
unbelievably complex explanation, which would involve a lot of extraneous details. But once you 
adopt an agential or psychological level of description, where the one driver has been instructed to 
take route 19 and has the appropriate goals and intentions, while the other driver has a different set 
of goals and intentions, associated with route 38, then that gives us a perfectly satisfactory 
explanation of the regularity. Similarly, in the case of many choice-behavioral phenomena, the right 
level of explanation is the psychological one, not the one associated with neuroscience. We must 
recognize that – in many cases – it is people’s mental states – their beliefs and preferences – that 
best explain their choices, not the details of the hardware implementation within the brain. 
Catherine Herfeld: I understand the pragmatic argument here, but a reductionist would probably 
object that the neurological explanation is ultimately a more fine-grained, a more detailed 
explanation and thereby offers us real understanding about the phenomenon, which is what we 
ultimately want. 
Christian List: Sometimes more fine-grained explanations can indeed be more illuminating than 
more coarse-grained ones. Suppose, for example, you want to explain why a person’s behavior 
changes under the influence of alcohol. Then it makes sense to invoke the biology of the human 
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organism. Biologists are able to explain how alcohol affects brain functions, and this sheds light on 
how exactly a person’s agential capacities are diminished under the influence of alcohol. Here we 
have a good example of how invoking the neural level can help to explain human behavior. In 
contrast, there are also cases in which providing further details of the hardware implementation of a 
cognitive process would be a distraction. It would not add anything useful from an explanatory 
perspective. In the example of the buses, we can really give a fully satisfactory explanation of why 
the two buses take different routes simply by pointing to the different intentional states of their 
drivers. Describing the drivers’ brain processes would be redundant and would distract us from the 
features that matter.  
Indeed, suppose you change the drivers, but keep the relevant instructions in place. Our intentional 
explanation is completely invariant under this change and continues to work just as well. With the 
new drivers, the two buses will still travel along their designated routes. However, the new drivers’ 
brains will be ever so slightly different. Therefore, many details of the neural story would have to be 
updated if we wanted to give a full neural-level account of why the new drivers equally take the 
appropriate bus routes. This shows that the brain is the wrong level of explanation here.   
Let me give you another example of why higher-level explanations are sometimes preferable to 
lower-level ones. Suppose your Microsoft word processor has a bug, and it systematically crashes 
under certain conditions. Say, whenever you simultaneously switch on the spell check and the 
tracking of changes, it crashes and it does so systematically. For example, it does this no matter 
what other software is installed, what the time of the day is, and which documents you are editing. 
And the issue persists even when you install the same word-processing software on another 
computer. The right level of explanation for this bug is obviously the level of the software, not the 
level of the hardware. There is a mistake in the software that gives rise to the crash. If you tried to 
give a more fine-grained explanation by focusing on the flow of electrons through the underlying 
computer chips, you might be able to identify some complicated configuration of electron flow that 
is associated with the crash of the computer. But a different flow of electrons could equally be 
associated with the same crash under different conditions. And the flow of electrons would most 
definitely be different if the computer were different. Intuitively speaking, the hardware level is the 
wrong level of explanation here. It is too fine grained. It would give you too many extraneous 
details, and these would impede rather than aid our understanding of the phenomenon we are trying 
to explain. 
Analogously, I suggest that, when we seek to explain human decision-making, the psychological 
level, rather than the neural one, is often the right level of explanation. It captures the relevant 
phenomena in a way that conveys neither too little nor too much information. 
Catherine Herfeld: You mention in your article ‘Mentalism vs. Behaviorism’ that economists reject 
the theory of choice by, for example, Gerd Gigerenzer not because it is not grounded upon the 
utility-maximization principle but rather because economists are unsure whether such theories offer 
the best explanations of empirical phenomena economists intend to explain. This is interesting 
because Gigerenzer’s work for example heavily relies upon empirical results from psychology etc. 
and seems to explain a lot of human behavior much better than traditional choice theories, precisely 
because it dispenses with those demanding assumptions of complete information, unlimited 
computational power, etc. that traditional rational choice theory rests upon. How, do you think, we 
can justify that rational choice theories are our best theories if they often do not offer good 
explanations? 
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Christian List: Let me clarify a few things. I am certainly not saying that approaches that are based 
on the assumption of maximization are necessarily better approaches than various non-
maximization-based alternatives. In fact, we have perfectly good reasons to believe that in many 
circumstances people satisfice rather than maximize when they make decisions, or that they use 
certain heuristics, as Gigerenzer shows. So, maximization is definitely not a universally confirmed 
pattern. I also think that Gigerenzer’s work is extremely interesting, and he has accumulated some 
compelling evidence for the use of simple heuristics by human decision-makers in a number of 
realistic choice situations. I find all this not only interesting but also relevant to our understanding 
of how people make decisions.  
What I would argue, though, is that Gigerenzer has not yet given us a fully satisfactory theory of 
decision making. He gives us a number of important data points that a good theory would have to 
accommodate, but it’s not clear to me that he has fully systematized this into a single unified theory. 
Gigerenzer provides good evidence that people employ simple heuristics in certain decision 
situations. When a doctor has to make a quick decision in a triage situation and has to figure out 
whether a patient is likely to have a heart attack, he or she might focus on a certain relatively short 
list of criteria and then go through these criteria quickly in some hierarchical order to distinguish 
between high-risk and low-risk patients. This might be a perfectly good heuristic for a quick 
decision – and one that strikes a decent balance between speed and accuracy.  
Equally, there is evidence that people sometimes employ the recognition heuristic. When asked 
which two of two cities is bigger, for instance San Diego or San Antonio, people tend to choose the 
city whose name they recognize, rather than the city whose name they don’t recognize. And that 
may also be a perfectly reasonable choice strategy. But the discovery of these – and other – 
examples does not yet amount to a general theory of decision making. Gigenzer gives us a great list 
of examples of heuristics that real people use when they make decisions. But ideally, we would like 
to subsume all these examples under the umbrella of a general theory that identifies the underlying 
mechanisms.  
I would argue that the heuristics-based forms of decision making that Gigerenzer has identified can 
be represented in the reason-based framework that Franz Dietrich and I propose. The different 
criteria on which a user of Gigerenzer’s heuristics focuses can be viewed as the motivationally 
salient properties of the options. The way in which the agent compares the options on the basis of 
those criteria can then be encoded in the fundamental preference relation or weighing relation. 
Suppose a doctor uses a heuristic involving three criteria to sort patients into potential heart attack 
cases and less urgent cases. She first looks at criterion one, and if that criterion is met, she puts the 
patient into the high-risk category, whereas if it’s not met, she moves on to criterion two. Again, she 
looks at whether that criterion is met. If it is, she puts the patient into the high-risk category, and if 
not, she moves to criterion three. If none of the criteria is met, the patient is classified as low-risk. 
That can easily be represented in terms of a reasons structure in which the motivational salience 
function picks out three properties as motivationally salient, namely those corresponding to the 
three criteria. The fundamental preference relation is then a lexicographic one. It compares 
combinations of properties as follows. Initially, just the first property is considered. If that property 
is included in combination x but not in combination y, then x is ranked above y. If there is a tie with 
respect to the first property, then the second property is considered, in the same way. If there is also 
a tie with respect to the second property, the third property is considered, and so on. In this way, a 
Gigerenzer-style ‘take-the-best’ heuristic can be represented in our framework.  
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More generally, our framework gives us a way of subsuming several ‘piecemeal’ decision principles 
under the umbrella of a more general mechanism, namely that of reason-based choice. 
Catherine Herfeld: Again, I understand that it is a valuable goal to unify all our observations and 
approaches under one single and general theory. However, as people have pointed out, it might not 
adequately capture the specific characteristics of gut feelings and heuristics when thinking about 
them in terms of a reason-based or rational choice, which not necessarily but plausibly would rest 
on the idea that you have certain reasons, you consciously deliberate about them, and then make a 
choice, whereas heuristics seem to capture exactly the opposite of what ‘choice’ entails. 
Christian List: The label ‘reason-based rational choice’ makes our approach sound more 
rationalistic than it is. I would argue that the role played by gut feelings can actually be captured in 
our framework. Crucially, the reason-based framework allows that properties can make a difference 
in two distinct ways. One, as I have already explained, is that a property can be motivationally 
salient so that an agent focuses on this property and evaluates options based on it. This is a fairly 
consciously aware mode of using properties to make choices. But properties can also influence 
choices in a more subconscious way. Namely: the properties of a context can affect which other 
properties become motivationally salient for the agent. It might be, for example, that if a context has 
one particular property, then this subconsciously leads the agent to focus on certain properties when 
assessing options in that context.  
Let me give you a simple example. Suppose I’m normally quite health conscious when I decide 
what to eat. I try to avoid foods that are too fatty or that are too sugary, as well as foods that are 
unhealthy in other ways. So, suppose that in normal circumstances, all of these health-related 
properties are motivationally salient for me. When I choose between different food items, I look at 
them through the lens of those properties. If some food has the unhealthy properties, I stay away 
from it, and if it has the healthy properties, I am drawn towards it. But it might also be that when I 
enter a restaurant in which there is a strong smell of fried food, my health-conscious attitudes go out 
of the window. There is this appetizing smell of chips and other deep-fried delicacies, and I develop 
a craving for fatty food and forget about my health-oriented motivations. In this context, the health-
related properties are no longer motivationally salient for me, and I focus on various flavor 
properties alone: the flavor of fat, sugar, saltiness, and so on. Now in that context, my choice 
behavior will be very different from my normal one. I suddenly choose unhealthy food items over 
healthy ones. What has happened is that a property of the context, namely the smell of fried food, 
has influenced my choices by making different properties motivationally salient for me. But all this 
may be entirely subconscious. I need not be consciously aware of this. Indeed, that’s the sort of 
thing that often happens in the case of framing effects. And we can naturally explain this in the 
reason-based framework. In short, the framework is nowhere near as rationalistic as the name might 
suggest at first sight.   
Catherine Herfeld: Much of your work involves axiomatization of some kind. In this regard, you 
have a lot in common with other decision theorists, such as Itzhak Gilboa, for example. At the same 
time, large parts of the justification of your account seems to be empirical. You even want to apply 
your general account to actual behavior as well as empirically test it. Here, your view seems to 
profoundly deviate from decision theorists such as Itzhak Gilboa, who argues that because most 
decision theories are axiomatic theories, rational choice theory is a purely theoretical undertaking. 
Why do you nevertheless think that using the axiomatic method is fruitful to formulate empirical 
theories? 
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Christian List: The idea of a reason-based explanation can in principle be spelled out without 
using the axiomatic method at all. In principle, you could just introduce the notion of a reasons 
structure and define what it means for a reasons structure to entail a choice function. Then you 
could call a choice function ‘reason-based explicable’ if and only if there exists some reasons 
structure that entails it. You can do all this without using the axiomatic method. But the axiomatic 
method is useful for showing that the notion of reason-based explicability is systematically related 
to some other conditions. We can show, for instance, that if, and only if, the choice function satisfies 
certain conditions, then it can be explained in this particular way.  
To illustrate the usefulness of the axiomatic method, consider an example from social choice theory, 
rather than individual decision theory. Take voting methods such as single transferable vote or 
alternative vote. Those voting methods are being used in some real-world elections, for instance in 
Ireland and in Australia. At first sight, they look attractive, and many reasonable people favour 
them. Indeed, alternative vote was being proposed as the alternative to plurality rule in a 
referendum in the UK a few years ago. 
Now when you study them axiomatically, it turns out that those voting methods violate an important 
axiom, namely monotonicity. It can happen that additional support for a previously winning 
candidate turns this candidate into a loser. So, a candidate who won the previous election may rise 
in some voters’ preference rankings while all other preferences remain equal, and yet this candidate 
may lose the next election, despite having gained additional electoral support. That’s a violation of 
monotonicity of the voting method. Once we see that a voting method violates this axiom, this 
should ring some alarm bells and prompt us to ask whether there is something conceptually wrong 
with this voting method. Without the axiomatic method, we might have overlooked this problem.   
Generally, by axiomatically characterizing a voting method, we come to a better understanding of 
its properties. Similarly, if we consider a particular decision principle for an individual agent and we 
axiomatically characterize it, this can give us a much better understanding of the nature of this 
decision principle. This is why the axiomatic method is a useful tool, even though we shouldn’t 
fetishize it. 
Catherine Herfeld: However, while the axiomatic method has often been appreciated precisely for 
allowing to investigate a formalized system by way of its properties, it has also been argued that the 
main value of axiomatization is the guarantee of internal consistency of such a system and the 
possibility to reach a generality by only formulating those properties of structurally similar 
phenomena that are highly abstract. Do you think that axiomatic theories also have any empirical 
value? 
Christian List: The axiomatic method is a very good tool for characterizing the logical space of 
possibilities, such as the logical space of possible decision methods. We can then ask where the 
decision methods that are being used in practice – in the real world – are located in this logical 
space. And we can axiomatically compare those real-world decision methods with the decision 
methods that would be recommended by certain normative criteria. We can ask: what would a 
normatively appealing decision method look like, and how would it differ from the decision 
methods that are being used in practice? (For a non-technical overview of my thoughts on the idea 
of ‘cartography of the logical space’, though in the context of social choice rather than individual 
choice, see my 2011 paper, ‘The Logical Space of Democracy’.) 
Catherine Herfeld: Transitivity is one axiom that is seen as a crucial property of preferences that 
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are considered to be rational. What do you consider to be the most reasonable axioms that should 
charatcterize a rational choice? 
Christian List: Let me answer this question from the perspective of the reason-based framework. 
Franz Dietrich and I do not assume from the outset that an agent’s fundamental preference relation 
must be transitive. Rather, we can use our framework to investigate under what conditions the 
fundamental preference relation is transitive and under what conditions it may fail to be transitive. It 
is an empirical question whether someone’s choice behavior is best explained by a reasons structure 
with a transitive fundamental preference relation or by one without transitivity. 
One reason why transitivity is an important property is this. If a binary relation – whether over 
options or over bundles of properties – is transitive, then it is a candidate for being interpreted as a 
‘betterness relation’: a relation that expresses betterness comparisons between options, or between 
property bundles. Of course, it might capture only subjective or agent-relative betterness judgments. 
But I accept John Broome’s point that transitivity is a necessary condition that any betterness 
relation must satisfy. Of course, not every transitive preference relation can reasonably be 
interpreted as expressing betterness judgments. But if we have a preference relation that is not 
transitive, then it is not even a candidate for being interpreted in this way. 
Catherine Herfeld: Although you mostly think of your account as a positive account, you also 
mentioned that theories of rational decision-making can be useful normative accounts. In fact, 
decision theorists frequently argue that the preference axioms imposed on the preference relation 
belonging to a rational actor should be satisfied. What do you think is the usefulness of rational 
choice theories as normative theories? 
Christian List: Our reason-based framework in its basic form is indeed concerned with the 
explanation of choices. So, the initial purpose is a positive one. However, we think that the same 
formal framework can also be employed for normative purposes. Specifically, the framework can be 
used to give a taxonomy of different moral theories and their implied decision principles 
(Dietrich/List 2017). If we adopt this normative interpretation, a reasons structure is no longer a pair 
consisting of a motivational salience function and a fundamental preference relation. Rather, it is a 
pair consisting of a normative relevance function and a suitably interpreted weighing relation. The 
normative relevance function specifies which properties of the options are normatively relevant in 
each context. And the weighing relation compares bundles of properties in terms of their choice-
worthiness from a normative perspective. Then one can show that a consequentialist theory (and its 
associated decision principle) can be naturally represented by a reasons structure in which no 
context-related properties are deemed normatively relevant, while a non-consequentialist theory can 
be represented by a reasons structure in which some context-related properties are deemed 
normatively relevant. So, the distinction between consequentialism and non-consequentialism 
corresponds to one of our two dimensions of context-dependence.  
Furthermore, the distinction between universalism and relativism corresponds to the other 
dimension of context dependence. A universalist theory (and its associated decision principle) is 
representable by a reasons structure in which the same properties are normatively relevant in all 
contexts, while a relativist theory is representable by a reasons structure in which different 
properties are relevant in different contexts. In this way, our framework provides useful tools for 
mapping out the space of different normative theories.   
Catherine Herfeld: Does your reason-based account have concrete policy implications? 
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Christian List: In its present form, it is still a relatively abstract theoretical framework, but it can 
provide some conceptual resources for more applied debates. Take, for instance, the debate about 
nudging. Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler have famously argued that policy makers and 
institutional designers should take into account the findings of psychologists and behavioral 
economists when designing decision environments in which people make choices. In particular, 
they have suggested that decision environments should be structured in such a way as to ‘nudge’ 
people into making better choices. Those arguments have prompted a lively debate about whether 
nudging is an acceptable form of paternalism and about whether there can be such a thing as liberal 
paternalism. For the purposes of our research program, Franz and I do not need to take a stand in 
this debate – though the debate is important. We think, however, that we can provide some useful 
tools for explaining the patterns of choice that scholars such as Sunstein and Thaler have in mind 
when they discuss nudges. The resulting lessons for institutional design will depend on our 
background assumptions and on our views in moral and political philosophy. 
Catherine Herfeld: What do you think are new trends in research about rational choice theory? 
Christian List: There are lots of new trends, and I can’t enumerate all of them here. I am 
particularly interested in certain interdisciplinary developments, including the development of 
connections between economics, psychology, philosophy, and computer science. And I would like 
to see a mentalistic approach to decision theory thrive. With respect to the research program of 
reason-based choice theory, I would be thrilled if some empirical researchers such as behavioral 
economists or psychologists got interested in it and engaged with it in their empirical work. I would 
be excited to see empirical work on whether reason-based explanations of choice outperform more 
traditional rational-choice-theoretic explanations, and on whether reasons-based explanations offer 
greater scope for predicting choices than traditional rational-choice-theoretic explanations do. I 
myself am not an empirical researcher, so I am not in the best position to design experiments to 
address these questions, but there is the potential for doing this. 
Catherine Herfeld: Are you after truth? 
Christian List: Yes, certainly. If one is engaged in the activity of science, then one should be 
engaged in the quest for truth. But often the truth is elusive and difficult to identify. And sometimes 
we are faced with competing explanations of the phenomena we are studying, and theoretical 
virtues such as parsimony, elegance, and explanatory power may be our only criteria for choosing 
between competing explanations. But ultimately, we are looking for true theories. The fact that I 
embrace mental state realism rather than instrumentalism reflects my realist, rather than anti-realist, 
leanings in the philosophy of science. One of the distinguishing characteristics of a scientific realist 
is precisely that he or she thinks that science seeks to arrive not merely at instrumentally useful 
theories but at true theories. 
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